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A Pragmatic Pact:  
Reconciliation and Reintegration in Sierra Leone 
Kieran Mitton 
 
A Sierra Leonean friend described returning to Sierra Leone in 2005 for the first time since 
peace was declared. Having fled during the war, he had followed violent events closely, 
fearing for friends and family left behind. He expected to find a society torn apart by grief 
and anger, with communities demanding retribution against perpetrators of atrocity. He 
was shocked – indeed almost frustrated - to find a very different situation. Victims of 
wartime violence talked of forgiving and forgetting, and of ‘moving on’. Ex-combatants lived 
alongside non-combatants, with little sign of tension. 1 His amazement was one which has 
been frequently expressed by visitors to Sierra Leone since the war. How can it be that 
people are not angrier or crying out for justice?  
 
The apparent capacity of Sierra Leoneans to ‘forgive and forget’, or at the very least, to 
accept former combatants back into their communities without seeking redress, is a notable 
feature of the post-war years.  Writing in 2003, Jeremy Ginifer described ‘a remarkable 
degree of forgiveness’ in an amputee camp in Freetown, home to hundreds who had legs 
and arms hacked-off during the war.2 He quoted the head of an international NGO, who said 
of his visit to Sierra Leone in 2002: ‘I found it amazing that they were looking forward so 
                                                          
1
 Email correspondence with Sierra Leonean diaspora member, October 2013, London. His experience was also 
recounted in a BBC Radio 3 documentary, broadcast on 28 September, 2005. 
2 Jeremy Ginifer, ‘Chapter 2, Reintegration of Ex-combatants’, in Malan, M, S. Meek, T. Thusi, J. Ginifer and P. 
Coker (eds) Monograph 80: Sierra Leone, Building the Road to Recovery, Institute for Security Studies,  
(Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2003) p.49. 
 2 
much, rather than wondering about the atrocities of the past.’3 More than ten years later, 
former fighters of various factions live and work side by side, both with each other and with 
those who never took up arms.  That it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell ex-combatants 
apart from other youths when traveling Sierra Leone’s towns and villages is frequently taken 
as a measure of just how successful reconciliation and reintegration has been.4  Combined 
with the peace that has held since 2002, this has strengthened the view that Sierra Leone is 
a post-conflict ‘success story’. 
 
The precise reasons for this success are less often or easily articulated. Even the most 
positive view of the Special Court (SCSL) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
would struggle to attribute post-conflict reconciliation and reintegration in Sierra Leone to 
these institutions. Some have argued that the answer lies, in part, in Sierra Leone’s own 
traditions and techniques of dealing with the past. Rosalind Shaw, for example, has drawn 
attention to the practice of ‘directed forgetting’, whereby Sierra Leoneans consciously forgo 
a potentially destabilising focus on past wrongs – and by extension, demands for vengeance 
or retributive justice - for the greater purpose of recovery.5 Others have pointed to the 
specific character of Sierra Leone’s civil war. Far from being a conflict centred on ethnic or 
religious divides, fighting forces shared a similar social composition and grievances. In this 
sense, as Gearoid Millar puts it, Sierra Leone’s conflict was ‘post-identity,’ and the post-war 
                                                          
3
 Ginifer (2003) p.49. 
4
 Interview with UNDP Youth Officer, 10 September 2008. See also Johanna Boersch-Supan, ‘What the 
Communities Say -The Crossroads Between Integration and Reconciliation: What Can Be Learned from the 
Sierra Leonean Experience?’, CRISE Working Paper, No. 63, (Oxford: CRISE, 2009) p.19. 
5 Rosalind Shaw, ‘Memory Frictions: Localizing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone’, The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 1, 183–207 (2007). 
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challenge of reconciliation has not been one of overcoming pronounced ‘otherising’ 
dynamics. Rather, Sierra Leoneans have been able to accept former fighters as ‘brothers.’6  
 
The interpretation that best accords with my own research among ex-combatants and 
communities, however, is that Sierra Leone has not, in fact, been an unqualified success for 
reconciliation, at least not in the terms by which it is often described.  A number of 
researchers drawing on extended periods of fieldwork have highlighted the extent to which 
appearances may be seriously, even dangerously, misleading. Laura Stovel found that 
although Sierra Leoneans may have ‘agreed to coexist and interact with ex-combatants, 
they had not reconciled in any deeply felt way.’7 Similarly, Ginifer warned that a worrying 
factor for peace in the country was that ‘reconciliation is not deep-rooted’.8 Regarding 
reintegration, similar assessments note that surface-level appearances mask deeper, more 
ominous realities. That many former fighters have not returned to their home communities, 
remaining instead among fellow ex-combatants in larger urban areas, is one reason to 
question their ‘reintegrated’ status.9 These observations raise the question of precisely how 
success in reintegration and reconciliation should be judged, and by whom. By extension, 
this calls for a critical examination of the very notions of reintegration and reconciliation, 
                                                          
6 Gearoid Millar, ‘‘Our brothers who went to the bush': Post-identity conflict and the experience of 
reconciliation in Sierra Leone’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 49, No. 5, 717-729 (2012). Whilst Millar is right 
to point out that it is incorrect to describe the war as an ethnic or religious conflict, my own fieldwork during 
2008-2012 suggests that otherising dynamics were in fact central to the dynamics of violence (see Kieran 
Mitton, Rebels in a Rotten State: Understanding Atrocity in the Sierra Leone Civil War (London/New York: 
Hurst/Oxford University Press, 2015). As such, the conflict is also misunderstood as ‘post-identity’.  That the 
divisions of war appeared to quickly fade with the arrival of peace may partly reflect the fact polarisation was 
largely endogenous to conflict; wartime identities and divides held less power in peace. Another reason is 
identified in this chapter: the role that a ‘pact’ of accommodation played in fostering coexistence among 
former enemies, united by a common struggle against poverty. 
7 Laura Stovel, ‘‘There's no bad bush to throw away a bad child’: ‘tradition’-inspired reintegration in post-war 
Sierra Leone’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2, 305-324 (2008)  p.315. 
8
 Ginifer (2003) p.51. 
9
 Boersch-Supan (2009) p.31. 
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and the extent to which ideas about these related processes may vary considerably between 
individuals, communities and cultures.  
 
This chapter examines the forms of reintegration and reconciliation that are said to have 
been reached in Sierra Leone, and assesses the terms in which Sierra Leoneans judge their 
success. It begins with a brief exploration of perceptions of the two formal transitional 
justice mechanisms – the SCSL and TRC – covering some of the most common criticisms 
made by Sierra Leoneans. This analysis draws out the degree to which the predominant 
criteria by which both institutions are commonly judged relates to their practical impact on 
assisting with everyday material challenges. What use is justice? Accordingly, the following 
section traces the development of discourses of reconciliation and reintegration. Drawing 
on extended field research, carried out by the author between 2008 and 2012,10 the central 
argument of this chapter is that both processes have been driven by a popular pragmatic 
focus on immediate, practical welfare needs, which at times may appear to conflict with 
demands for justice, truth-telling and reflection on the past. Shaped by an emphasis on 
what is useful, reconciliation in Sierra Leone is best understood, I argue, as a tacitly agreed 
‘pact of accommodation’ between former fighters and wider society. This pact incorporates 
a collective agreement to lay blame for the war beyond the agency of individual fighters, 
and a conscious re-branding of ex-combatants as ‘youth’ in society. It is agreed because it is 
useful for avoiding further conflict, and is viewed as the most realistic, perhaps only option, 
for improving the day-to-day situation of former fighters and non-combatants alike – both 
                                                          
10
 Fieldwork was conducted for two main projects: one assessing reintegration, another exploring the 
dynamics of wartime atrocity (see Mitton, 2015). Regular visits amounted to roughly 16 months in total, 
undertaken between September 2008 and April 2012. Informal and semi-structured interviews were carried 
out across Sierra Leone with a broad cross-section of society, but the majority of informants were ex-
combatants and victims of violence. 
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united by an ongoing struggle against poverty. The chapter thus raises the question of 
whether a pragmatic approach to dealing with the past (and the present) has led to a 
‘negative peace’ – defined as the absence of organized, collective violence -  in which many 
ex-combatants have avoided reintegration and reconciliation altogether.11 I draw upon the 
experience of ‘traditional’ reconciliation efforts in south-eastern Sierra Leone to highlight 
the degree to which a ‘deeper’ form of reconciliation is needed in many rural settings, and 
to show why this deeper reconciliation is likely to facilitate greater reintegration for 
returning ex-combatants. However, the analysis also identifies a danger in returning to 
tradition, arguing that the terms by which ex-combatants are integrated include a subtle 
reification of political and generational structures that work counter to long-term peace and 
stability. Finally, the chapter concludes with consideration of the wider lessons that may be 
learned from Sierra Leone’s experiences of transitional justice and its current form of peace. 
 
 
What Use Is Justice? 
The SCSL and TRC have received sustained criticism since their inception.  By trying only 
those considered to bear the greatest responsibility for war crimes, the SCSL stands accused 
of distorting the reality of wartime abuses, allowing many of those who committed violence 
to escape justice. Among those who were indicted, the trial of former Civil Defence Forces 
(CDF) leaders, such as the popular Hinga Norman, also proved controversial, with the CDF 
regarded as heroic liberators in many parts of southern and eastern Sierra Leone.12 On a 
                                                          
11 See Johan Galtung, Theories of Peace: A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking (Oslo: International Peace 
Research Institute, 1967), p.12, who defines positive peace, by contrast, as including such societal features as 
equality, justice and freedom from fear and want. 
12
 See Gberie chapter in this volume 
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technical level, the Special Court and TRC have been criticised for inadequately 
communicating their purpose and processes.13 Popular confusion over the role of both 
organisations, and apparent conflict between two supposedly complimentary institutions, 
has been well-documented.14 However, perhaps the most biting criticism is not so much 
that the SCSL or TRC failed to sufficiently communicate their objectives, but that their 
communication went in only one direction, from the top down. Sierra Leonean views on 
whether and which transitional justice mechanisms were appropriate were not adequately 
incorporated. The Special Court, in particular, has been condemned as an externally 
imposed exercise serving the aims of the international community, and paying insufficient 
regard to the needs or desires of ordinary Sierra Leoneans.15 This perception has been 
reinforced by the conduct of trials within a heavily guarded compound in Freetown, as well 
as in the Hague, far from the reach of most citizens. By failing to gauge local needs, the 
argument goes, both institutions failed to meet local needs. Sierra Leonean ideas about 
justice were neglected, and according to a number of researchers, traditional practices of 
reconciliation were directly contradicted by the promotion of ‘truth-telling.’16  
 
There is, of course, no ideal or perfect form of justice available. And for all the criticisms, we 
cannot know how Sierra Leone may have fared without the SCSL or the TRC. Within Sierra 
Leone, opinions on the need for such institutions vary from individual to individual, and it is 
difficult to support any generalised views as wholly representative of a particular section of 
                                                          
13
 See for instance Rachel Kerr and Jessica Lincoln, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Outreach, Legacy and 
Impact—Final Report, War Crimes Research Group, Department of War Studies (London: King's College 
London, 2008). 
14
 See Shaw (2007); Tim Kelsall, ‘Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in Sierra Leone’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2, 361-391 (2005). 
15 See Friederike Mieth, ‘Bringing Justice and Enforcing Peace? An Ethnographic Perspective on the Impact of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone’, International Journal of Conflict and Violence, Vol 7, No 1., 10-22 (2013), 
for example. 
16
 See, for example, Shaw (2007) and Kelsall (2005). 
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society, whether ex-combatants, amputees, youths, members of urban elites or rural 
villagers. This reality is partly reflected in academic assessments of reconciliation and 
reintegration in Sierra Leone, which disagree over exactly what kind of justice, if any, people 
desire. Shaw and Kelsall, for example, found that many Sierra Leoneans did not wish to talk 
about the war or dwell on abuses. Kelsall understands truth-telling as ill-fitted to Sierra 
Leone’s traditions of dealing with the past, suggesting that ritualised ceremonies may be 
more effective for reconciliation when truth is ‘too close to home and too much to bear’.17 
Shaw likewise argues that dwelling on the past runs counter to a tradition of ‘directed 
forgetting’18. In contrast, Boersch-Supan reports ‘a demand for talking about the past’19, and 
Stovel argues that ‘while customs discourage open conversations about problematic events, 
it does not follow that all or even most Sierra Leoneans prefer silence or avoidance’, 
concluding that the TRC itself shows that ‘many Sierra Leoneans wanted to talk and hear 
about the past.’20  
 
During my own research with perpetrators and victims of atrocities, it was clear that both 
perspectives remain valid. Many were eager to talk about the war, but typically in a context 
that related to their present-day difficulties. This was the truth that was given focus, and the 
form of justice desired invariably related to reparations or practical assistance in dealing 
with these contemporary difficulties.21 This focus shaped the criteria by which the suitability 
and success of the TRC and SCSL were judged, and was evident in many discussions with an 
                                                          
17
 Kelsall (2005) p.390. Kelsall does not reject TRC hearings altogether, but suggests they may be more 
effective by incorporating ritual elements. 
18
 Shaw (2007). 
19
 Boersch-Supan (2009) p.45. 
20
 Stovel (2008) p.320. 
21 Boersch-Supan (2009), p.40, likewise found the main theme of her interviews to be a ‘nexus between 
integration and economic development’, and that ‘food security, poverty reduction, and employment were the 
main concerns of the majority of my respondents.’  
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amputee community in Grafton, on the outskirts of Freetown.22 Asked whether they 
harboured anger or resentment towards those who had mutilated them, or how they 
viewed the SCSL and TRC, responses always returned to a question of practical needs. The 
chair of an amputee organisation stated: ‘I think we have imperfect peace in Sierra Leone. I 
am always telling people that the peace is from us.’23 She went on to explain that amputees 
were not at peace because of their dire economic situation. 
We are angry with the government. I am angry with the government because it 
is them that is able to make everything good for us. It’s so hard for me to 
forgive. Because if you want to eat, want to do something, want to buy this, but 
you are not able – who can forgive? Everything is difficult … My children are not 
angry with the rebels. They are angry with the government, because the 
government is responsible for helping.24 
 
The same community nevertheless frequently repeated the phrase ‘we forgive but we don’t 
forget’, a transformation of the early post-war mantra ‘forgive and forget’. Forgiveness, my 
research suggests, was the agreement to peacefully coexist with ex-combatants and not 
‘dig-up skeletons’. Not forgetting, however, reflected the reality that the violence inflicted 
upon the amputees left them struggling to secure basic welfare. Anger over this situation 
was not directed at ex-combatants, but at the government and the formal justice 
mechanisms, which had been expected to provide assistance. ‘They don’t understand 
                                                          
22
 Members of this community have been regularly interviewed over the years, and their perspectives are to 
be found in many publications concerning reconciliation. I was able to regularly spend time with members 
between September 2008-August 2009, in April 2010, and in April 2012.  
23
 Interview, Chair of local amputee organisation, Grafton, 14 May, 2009. 
24
 Interview, Chair of local amputee organisation. 
 9 
anything. We the victims are suffering.  They don’t care about us’, said one elderly 
amputee.25 Shaw recorded similar frustrations during her earlier fieldwork:  
 
If you say peace should come, we the amputees should bring the peace. I cannot 
be struggling and say that I am living in peace. That is why our case should be 
pushed forward. If our problem is left behind, the war will not end. We the 
amputees, we all have children.26 
 
Similarly, for those who testified at the TRC, disappointment over limited personal benefit 
was pronounced. Some even viewed the Commission as a ‘provocation.’27 For whilst the 
body which many believed would assist the victims of the war had not offered tangible 
assistance to individuals or communities, the DDR programme had provided skills-training 
and cash payments to those who had fought. This frustration was compounded by the 
substantial resources expended on lengthy trials at the SCSL, which many felt should have 
been directed towards assisting victims. Noting that more than $300 million has been spent 
on the SCSL, Hoffman provided a damning verdict on the Court and TRC:  ‘Despite millions of 
dollars spent on these proceedings, neither body has succeeded in fundamentally changing 
the daily lives of Sierra Leoneans who still grapple with the aftermath of war.’28  
 
                                                          
25
 Interview, senior member of Grafton amputee community, 14 May 2009. 
26
 Shaw (2007), p.206. 
27 Gearoid Millar, ‘Expectations and Experiences of Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: Parallel Peacebuilding 
Processes and Compound Friction’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 20, No. 2, 189-203 (2013), p.195-96. See 
also Shaw (2007), p.198. 
28 Elisabeth Hoffman, ‘Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: Local Processes Yield Global Lessons’, The Fletcher Forum 
for World Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 2, 129–141 (2008), p.131. 
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In the post-war years, countless testimonies from victims of the conflict have echoed 
Hoffman’s assessment, drawing attention to the central question of the practical utility of 
justice. An amputee in Freetown told Rehrl: ‘If the boy who cut off my arm goes to prison 
now, well, then maybe that's called justice. But even if that boy goes to jail, I will never get 
my arm back.’29 In Magburaka, in the Northern Province, an individual told Boersch-Supan:  
‘For me specifically, I say let them leave this people freely. Even if they kill them or punish 
them, that will not give us back our lost people or property. It will not give us personal 
benefit.’30 Another respondent put it bluntly: ‘We are not interested in creating further 
problems, just give us assistance.’31  
 
The above statements encapsulate the logic that has driven reconciliation and reintegration 
in Sierra Leone, regardless of the formal processes of transitional justice. A determination to 
focus on development, seen almost as a silver-bullet for challenges of poverty and 
governmental failures, and the associated imperative of avoiding ‘further problems’, has led 
to a pact of accommodation. Before examining this pact more closely, it is first necessary to 
understand the manner in which the frustrations described above have grown from the 
discourse of reconciliation and reintegration promoted by transitional justice institutions. 
This discourse has consolidated two main features of Sierra Leone’s post-war peace; a belief 
that accommodation is necessary to avoid conflict and ‘move on’, which also ties into 
traditional notions of reconciliation concerning forgetting; and a belief that moving on is the 
surest way to address the difficult conditions of everyday poverty.    
 
                                                          
29
 Annette Rehrl (2004) ‘Sierra Leone: We want reconciliation. We will never forget. But we try to forgive’, 
Refugees Magazine, No. 136, 15-18 (2004), p.17.  
30
 Boersch-Supan (2009), p.40. 
31
 Boersch-Supan (2009), p.40. 
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‘Save Sierra Leone from another War’: Discourses of Reconciliation and 
Reintegration 
 
In the aftermath of a brutally violent civil war, it may seem intuitive that victims of abuses 
would be most vocal in seeking justice or addressing their trauma through reconciliation 
processes. However, a legacy of the war’s devastation in Sierra Leone was a shared 
determination by civilians and ex-combatants to avoid a return to conflict, and, in this 
respect, calls for public truth-telling or legal redress were often viewed as potentially 
divisive and dangerous. They might undermine the peace, seen as critical to development 
and the meeting of basic material needs, even risking returning the country to further 
violence.  Shaw describes the tension that pervaded in 2002: 
 
 […] Almost everyone seemed nervous about the upcoming TRC. That year 
marked the official end of the civil war, and a lot of people felt uneasy about a 
process that would activate memories of the violence that still seemed so close. 
The teenaged ex-combatants among whom I conducted fieldwork that year 
regarded this process with trepidation: some feared it would disrupt their 
integration into civilian society, and all dreaded the return of their own 
memories.32  
 
According to Shaw, in local tradition ‘healing and reconciliation depend on forgetting rather 
than truth-telling.’33 Communities therefore ‘sought to displace explicit verbal memories’ 
                                                          
32
 Shaw (2007) p.194. 
33
 Shaw (2007) p.194. 
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through various social and ritual practices, including prayers, funerals, church services and 
sacrifices. The purpose of this forgetting was fundamentally practical – ‘to create ‘cool 
hearts’ that form the basis for life in a community.'34  This did not amount to individuals 
erasing personal memories, but rather ‘their containment in a form that would enable them 
to recover their lives.’35  
 
The work of the SCSL and TRC seemed to conflict with local preferences. However, appeals 
for participation and support of these institutions, as well as the wider process of 
reintegrating ex-combatants, were couched in terms sensitive to the concern to ‘move on’. 
Far from the Court or the TRC presenting a threat to peace, Sierra Leoneans were 
‘sensitised’ that failure to address the past or forgive ex-combatants was itself the surest 
way to return to conflict. This message was not only promulgated by external interveners. 
As a TRC official explained to Shaw, although many Sierra Leoneans ‘just wanted peace’, 
there existed a ‘very strong vocal minority that thought that people needed to talk about 
what happened.’36 The TRC itself was explicit in promoting truth-telling and reconciliation as 
the only way to achieve lasting peace and stability. TRC hearings and sensitisation drives 
carried such slogans as ‘Truth Today, A Peaceful Sierra Leone Tomorrow’, ‘It’s hard to speak 
the truth, but only this will bring peace’, and more urgently, ‘Save Sierra Leone from 
another War. Reconcile Now. TRC Can Help.’37 The linking of the TRC to material assistance 
was less explicit than the link to peace, since in reality, the Commission had minimal powers 
                                                          
34
 Shaw (2007) p.195. 
35
 Shaw (2007) p.195. 
36
 Shaw (2007) p.196. This minority was predominantly composed of human rights activists, an educated group 
typically conversant in ‘development-speak’ and generally more receptive to Western forms of justice. 
Interviews with this stratum of society alone could thus present a misleading impression of ‘local’ opinion (see 
Millar, 2013, for further discussion). As ever, it is important to appreciate ‘local’ identity as heterogeneous.      
37
 For these slogans see Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. 1, Ch. 4 (2004); Kelsall (2005), p.365, and Shaw (2007), p.199. 
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beyond making recommendations for reparations. Nevertheless, it was often implied that 
participation would bring such benefits, whether individually or in the broader sense of 
restoring communities to an economically functioning whole.38 It was in expectation of 
tangible welfare assistance that many non-combatant participants appeared to testify. Thus, 
as Kelsall notes, they viewed their engagement with the TRC ‘principally in instrumental 
terms, a deal under which they would exchange their stories for a share of the government's 
economic resources.’39  
 
The reintegration process was similarly linked to the national discourse of ‘moving on’ and 
an emphasis on securing practical material assistance 40 It was likewise promoted by a 
carrot-and-stick approach, emphasising on the one hand its day-to-day usefulness in 
restoring communities to fully functioning order and providing them with newly-skilled 
youths, whilst conversely warning of the dangers of rejecting ex-combatants. Sensitisation 
campaigns by UN agencies, NGOs and the National Commission on Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR), were instrumental in popularising a discourse 
that held reconciliation and reintegration as essential for peace and development.41 From 
the moment of demobilisation, the message that ‘people had to move past the war for 
peace to prevail’ was instilled in combatants and the communities that received them.42 
And, according to Catherine Bolten, who conducted research in the northern town of 
Makeni:  
                                                          
38
 See Shaw (2007), p.201. 
39
 Kelsall (2005), p.371. See Shaw (2007) p.201 for similar observations. 
40
 In fact, Millar (2013), p.195, notes that many non-combatants expected the TRC to deliver material benefits 
similar to those awarded to ex-combatants by the DDR programme. 
41
 Ginifer (2003), p.45. 
42 Catherine Bolten, ‘“We Have Been Sensitized”: Ex-Combatants, Marginalization, and Youth in Postwar Sierra 
Leone’, American Anthropologist, Vol. 114, No. 3, 496–508 (2012), p.502. 
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Sensitization training usurped discussion, replacing it with a discourse conveying 
the official contours of peace and informing people that between the political 
necessity of amnesty and the social necessity of forgiveness, objections to 
reintegration were tantamount to “disturbing the peace.”43  
 
Presented with the stark choice between accepting ex-combatants back into the fold, or 
threatening peace, there appeared to be no choice. Sierra Leoneans, as Boersch-Supan puts 
it, ‘accepted a trade-off between coexistence with former perpetrators and peace.’44 This 
trade-off also promised material benefits to communities receiving returning combatants. In 
addition to former fighters’ value as labour due to the skills training they received upon 
disarming, NGOs and development agencies also provided development support.45  
 
The goals of reconciliation and reintegration were further pursued through a conscious 
‘rebranding’ of ex-combatants across Sierra Leone, strongly driven by formal DDR 
programmes and NGOs engaged in local reconciliation projects. Communities were 
encouraged to view combatants as victims themselves, a perspective which took into 
account that many had been forcibly recruited and brutalised by rebels. This was 
particularly true of returning child soldiers, with communities ‘sensitised’ by NGOs to 
embrace a discourse that ‘children were not responsible for their crimes because of their 
                                                          
43
 Bolten (2012) p.497. 
44
 Boersch-Supan (2009) p.20. 
45 Bolten (2012), p. 504. With the return of children in particular, agencies such as UNICEF assisted with 
building schools and paying fees. Susan Shepler, ‘The Rites of the Child: Global Discourses of Youth and 
Reintegrating Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone’, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 4, No. 2, 197-211 (2005), p.203, 
notes: ‘the reintegration of children is explicitly linked to the nation, to national identity and to economic 
development.’  
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age and that children had a right to be reunified with their family.’46 Described by Susan 
Shepler as a discourse of ‘abdicated responsibility’, this encouraged returning combatants 
(and recipient communities) to lay blame for their past abuses elsewhere, be it on the 
leaders on trial at the Special Court, or on the effects of drugs they had been forced to take. 
Former fighters were also returned to the wider community of ‘youth’ through a conscious 
reshaping of every-day language. A Sierra Leonean UNDP official told me in 2008 that the 
term ‘ex-combatant’ was no longer used - the correct term was now ‘youth.’47 This followed 
a pattern that had been established by the reintegration programme, as recounted to 
Bolten:  ‘we were made to be aware that the process was about turning combatants into ex-
combatants, and turning ex-combatants into civilians. So once a man agreed to be disarmed 
and go through the training, he was just a man again. Just an ordinary man.’48  
 
The Pact of Accommodation – an ‘Imperfect Peace’ 
These discourses of peace and reconciliation have shaped what I refer to as a pragmatic 
‘pact of accommodation.’ Peaceful coexistence is driven by the collective desire to move on 
from conflict, to avoid a potentially divisive focus on past abuses, and to embrace peace as a 
means to receive greater welfare security.  Ex-combatants are recast as youths and as 
victims, as the promise of peace and development is bound to the notion that Sierra 
Leoneans will forgive, if not quite forget. Their reintegration, as a Makeni bishop told 
Boersch-Supan, rests on an ‘unspoken agreement. To not dig up old skeletons.’49 Formed on 
the basis of avoiding conflict, to ‘Save Sierra Leone from another War’, this form of mutual 
                                                          
46
 Shepler (2005), p.200-201. 
47
 Interview, UNDP youth officer, Murray Town, Freetown, 10 September 2008. See also Boersch-Supan (2009), 
p.25.  
48
 Bolten (2012), p.501. 
49
 Boersch-Supan (2009), p.21. 
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toleration has been aided by formal discourses of reconciliation, and yet it does not support 
the view that retributive justice, or truth-telling and confrontation of the past, is critical to 
either peace or development. Rather, experiences of the TRC and SCSL have convinced 
many Sierra Leoneans that these forms of justice and reconciliation will not meet their 
needs of basic welfare or peace, whereas accommodation of ex-combatants will at least 
avert fresh conflict.  
 
For a country emerging from protracted and violent conflict, the pragmatic form of 
reconciliation and reintegration achieved in Sierra Leone might be considered a success, at 
least in terms of being expedient in the short term. Certainly there has been no return to 
mass violence and former fighters coexist peacefully with those who once suffered at their 
hands. However, scratching below the surface of reintegration reveals a far less positive 
picture, and we must question whether ‘reintegration’ is an appropriate term at all. For 
although in Sierra Leone’s towns and capital,former fighters may live and work side-by-side 
with civilians and those of former rival factions, this apparent harmony masks the reality 
that thousands are in urban areas because they have been unable or unwilling to return to 
their rural home communities. For many ex-combatants, re-integration provides a false 
notion of their prior incorporation into the social, economic and political life of the country. 
Physical ‘relocation’, even social dislocation, may be the more accurate term to describe 
their experiences. The tide of urbanisation in post-war Sierra Leone owes much to this form 
of ‘reintegration’, in which the anonymity afforded by settling in urban areas – and their 
distance from sites of wartime abuses – is preferred over a difficult return to rural villages 
 17 
and their inescapable intimacy.50 This avoidance is a key element of the pact of 
accommodation. A chiefdom official in Magbruka described an ‘implicit deal’ to Boersch-
Supan: ‘communities integrate those who have not done bad in that particular place, while 
other communities integrate those who had to leave.’51 
 
This form of reintegration raises questions over the depth of reconciliation that has taken 
place in Sierra Leone, and again, terms such as ‘mutual tolerance’ or ‘coexistence’ may be 
more appropriate. In assessing reconciliation, Stovel differentiates between ‘rational’ and 
‘sentient’ reconciliation. The former is a process of ‘coming to agreement, coming together 
or coexisting peacefully.’ The latter involves a ‘deeper’ form of reconciliation, and includes 
‘building trust, healing from a loss or trauma or coming to terms with events.’52 
Unsurprisingly, she finds more evidence of rational rather than sentient reconciliation in 
Sierra Leone, concluding that ‘while Sierra Leoneans generally agreed to coexist and interact 
with ex-combatants, they had not reconciled in any deeply felt way.’53  
 
This lack of deep reconciliation is especially apparent in smaller towns and villages where 
civilians must coexist with known former aggressors. It also apparent in those instances 
where ex-combatants seek forgiveness in their host communities, but are granted only 
accommodation, as Bolten’s research in Makeni attests.54 Here, through daily techniques of 
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avoidance, civilians tolerated ex-combatants for the sake of preventing conflict, yet 
simultaneously kept them at arm’s length. Former fighters lived in a ‘parallel social world’, 
and according to Bolten, struggled to secure the deeper acceptance that might allow their 
full incorporation into the community.55 This was a source of frustration for ex-combatants. 
They had adhered to the message of forgiveness promoted by the TRC and reintegration 
programme, which led them to expect full acceptance by civilians should they ask for it, yet 
they had been denied. A former rebel told Boersch-Supan: ‘There is no proper reintegration. 
Only lip service but they don’t have it at mind or heart.’56  
 
That some communities may have paid ‘lip-service’ to reintegration and reconciliation partly 
reflects a belief that ex-combatants themselves have paid only lip-service when offering 
statements of remorse or requesting forgiveness. If we can ask ‘do civilians really want to 
forgive ex-combatants?’, we should also ask ‘do ex-combatants really want to be forgiven?’ 
According to Bolten’s findings in Makeni, many civilians viewed ex-combatant behaviour as 
remaining unchanged and lacking in humility. Their behaviour was seen as proof that their 
expressions of remorse were hollow. Whilst there may in fact be very good reasons for 
former fighters’ reluctance to adopt the requisite humility – a critical issue that we shall 
return to shortly – this perspective is understandable. My research with those who had 
committed atrocities uncovered their complex relationship with a violent past, traversing a 
whole spectrum from shame to pride. Few of those I spent time with showed signs of 
remorse for their abuses, an attitude that accorded with the discourse of victimhood 
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intended to ease their reintegration. 57 Boersch-Supan found likewise: ‘None of the ex-
combatants I interviewed showed remorse for the crimes they had committed. Most hid 
behind the argument of having been victims themselves, since they were forced to fight.’58 
Of ex-combatant appearances at the TRC, Kelsall observed: ‘none of them admitted to 
individual responsibility for their actions, and none of them appeared genuinely contrite. 
Because their statements had been empty, their apologies rang hollow.’59   
 
The tensions that can arise between former combatants and those asked to provide 
forgiveness have not necessarily affected all communities. This is true where space affords 
more than arm’s length distance between victims and former aggressors, as in Freetown. 
Yet where problems have arisen, particularly in rural villages – precisely the places where 
many ex-combatants have preferred not to return – there are signs to suggest some 
communities have found ways to resolve friction. In these communities, lack of deeper 
reconciliation is likely to be more visible and more detrimental to peace, stability, and the 
economic functioning of the village. The pact of accommodation proves less useful for the 
purpose of moving on and avoiding conflict. It is perhaps for this reason that Sierra Leonean-
driven reconciliation processes have tended to focus in the rural south and east, framed as a 
response to the failure – or indeed irrelevance – of the TRC and SCSL in addressing local 
needs.60 One notable programme is ‘Fambul Tok’ (meaning ‘family talk’), which has the 
express purpose of helping communities at the village-level identify and pursue the forms of 
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reconciliation they desire.61  They have done so by combining the TRC’s emphasis on truth-
telling with traditional rituals, bonfire ceremonies and individuals confessing to abuses and 
requesting the forgiveness of their victims and communities.62  
 
Judging the long-term impact of ritual ceremonies of reconciliation is a difficult task, and it 
would be unwise to view the immediate cathartic emotional release surrounding such 
events as necessarily amounting to a fundamental transformation of relations between ex-
combatants and their communities.63 Nevertheless, fieldwork in the eastern Kailahun region 
of Sierra Leone, during the time Fambul Tok had recently begun its work, suggested that the 
programme had been enthusiastically received by many villages. In Bomaru, where war first 
arrived and the first Fambul Tok ceremony took place, villagers described the subsurface 
tensions that had troubled the community prior to the ceremony.64 Former combatants and 
those who harboured grievances against them employed techniques of everyday evasion, 
such as the avoidance of conversation, even eye contact – what Mac Ginty has termed 
‘everyday diplomacy’.65 However, unresolved tensions would occasionally surface during 
minor disputes, with arguments quickly escalating and switching focus to war-related 
grievances and ‘rebel’ identities. A similar dynamic is described by Boersch-Supan: ‘In the 
context of tension or instability, allegations against ex-combatants arise quickly. This is true 
on the mundane level of everyday interactions as well as events of larger scale.’66  
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Following their engagement with Fambul Tok, residents of Bomaru explained, tensions had 
lifted and the community was described as being ‘whole’ again. The practical value of this 
change was emphasised by participants. For instance, it enabled ex-combatants to work 
together with others for the economic good of the community, a central aim of Fambul Tok: 
‘This healing is necessary in order for individuals to contribute to sustainable peace and 
development.’67 One resident described another positive outcome: people no longer had to 
pay a local official to arbitrate in disputes. Now that the community had a designated ‘peace 
tree’ where disagreements could be calmly resolved, money was being saved.68 It was 
unclear whether beyond this, residents expected or hoped that Fambul Tok would bring 
development or forms of material assistance, but the simple fact of receiving assistance at 
all was celebrated. There was little doubt, in the minds of those I spoke with, that this form 
of reconciliation had proved useful and relevant to their needs, in a way that the TRC and 
SCSL had not.  
 
The experience of Fambul Tok suggests that there may indeed be a desire and need for 
deeper reconciliation in parts of Sierra Leone. It also highlights the importance of restoring 
ex-combatants to a ‘useful’ role within their communities, with ‘usefulness’ being what 
Bolten describes as a ‘tenet of positive social personhood’ in Sierra Leone.’69 It is precisely 
this question of usefulness, and the manner in which ex-combatants are willing (or able) to 
be ‘usefully’ incorporated into the social fabric of communities, which may explain civilian 
reluctance to engage in deeper forgiveness in Makeni. It would seem that the appropriate 
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ex-combatant behaviour for demonstrating genuine remorse - as viewed by civilians – 
should be a willingness to work hard and be of use to the community.70  
 
Throughout TRC hearings and reintegration sensitisation, Sierra Leoneans were told that 
with reconciliation and the skills-training former fighters received, they would become 
productive and valuable members of the community. The head of a child reintegration 
agency explained to Stovel that he told combatants: ‘the chief will take you now as a 
valuable person.’71 The reality, however, proved very different. In 2003, Ginifer warned: 
‘many ex-combatants will have little prospect of securing productive work when they return 
to their communities.’72 This reflected not just unresolved tensions between ex-combatants 
and communities, nor the sheer lack of opportunities in the post-war economy, but also the 
woeful inadequacy of the skills-training many received. Again, expectations outstripped 
reality. Skills-training was poorly and inconsistently implemented, whilst those who 
graduated their courses often found their skills were unsuited or insufficient to make a 
living. Many chose to sell their tool-kits, compounding civilian perceptions that ex-
combatants had squandered the assistance they had disproportionately received.73 With 
certificates testifying to skills rendered of little value, and without the assistance of family or 
friends – social ties often severed during war that in part relied on reintegration for 
restoration – many former fighters were unable to find work and thus demonstrate their 
‘usefulness’. This gave traction to a widely-held view that ex-combatants were ‘idle’, 
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reluctant to contribute meaningfully to their communities, or simply ‘useless.’74 And, as 
Bolten observed: ‘As ex-combatants lost the ability to contribute, civilian willingness to 
integrate them—even for their own purposes—vanished.’75  
 
The perceived failure of ex-combatants to contribute to their communities through earnest 
labour and hard-work, preferring – supposedly – to maintain lives of idleness or even 
criminality, has often been taken as demonstrating their limited commitment to deep 
reconciliation.76 Furthermore, it has been seen as a rejection of the fundamental social 
values upon which communities function. Echoing generational tensions that preceded, and 
even precipitated, the war, former fighters have been viewed as embodying a detrimental 
form of rebellion against traditional society. Yet in some respects, ex-combatant’s inability 
to ‘usefully’ integrate may be a direct consequence of their being kept at arm’s length – they 
are not accepted because they are ‘idle’, yet they are ‘idle’ because they are not accepted.77 
This is only part of the story, however.  There is another reason for ex-combatant’s failure, 
or reluctance, to integrate in terms that accord with traditional conceptions of usefulness 
and social value. It relates to civilian concerns of rebellion, and offers another answer to the 
question of why the pact of accommodation has prevailed in the place of deeper forms of 
reconciliation. It is to this aspect we now turn. 
 
 
Restoring Injustice?  
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The Sierra Leone civil war has been described as stemming from a ‘crisis of youth’.78 Much 
has been written on the extent to which the younger generations of pre-war society had 
become frustrated with the perceived self-serving patrimonial rule of traditional elites, at 
both national and village level. Frequently victim to abuses of political power and private 
jurisprudence, and exploited for their labour yet unable to improve their social and 
economic standing, these youths and their grievances provided fuel for the RUF and the war 
it brought in 1991. Although the majority of the RUF’s recruits were forcibly conscripted, my 
interviews showed that many had already been labelled as ‘rebels’ due to their rejection of 
the traditional social roles they were expected to take in their home villages.79 They recalled 
frustration with their powerless status and a yearning to move to a bigger town, escaping a 
life of subsistence farming and subservience to the gerontocracy. The RUF not only 
presented a challenge to traditional elites through its rhetoric and violence; it inducted 
recruits into a reversed, albeit brutal, form of social organisation, in which the powerless 
might gain power, and the young might take on the status of adulthood. The RUF quickly 
and violently diverged from its stated political goals, but the atrocities of its cadres often 
betrayed the anger felt towards established authorities.80 As the TRC recorded, from the 
first days of conflict: ‘[c]hiefs, Speakers, elders and other social, cultural and religious 
figureheads were singled out for humiliation and brutal maltreatment by combatants.’81  
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With the end of war, the role of the youth crisis in fomenting conflict was given prime 
attention. The TRC recommended that ‘the youth question be viewed as a national 
emergency that demands national mobilisation.’82 Of paramount concern was that youths 
were incorporated into political life, given a ‘stake’ in society and no longer economically 
exploited or marginalised. Yet despite the TRC’s recommendations, the discourse of 
reconciliation, including that promoted by the TRC, has subtly implied that ex-combatant’s 
reintegration is conditional on their return to a mode of ‘youth’ similar to, if not the same 
as, that which predominated before the war. Participation in TRC hearings, and the general 
process of seeking forgiveness and acceptance by society, has required ex-combatants to 
resubmit to the authority and traditions of recipient communities. Not unreasonably, as 
Bolten’s research in Makeni highlights, those expected to reconcile with ex-combatants 
expect them to abide by the rules and social conventions of their communities. However, to 
ex-combatants, this may appear to constitute not so much reconciliation as conformity to 
the very strictures against which they had fought. The pivotal reconciliatory element of TRC 
hearings may not have been confessions of guilt or expressions of remorse, but rather the 
symbolic resubmission of ex-combatants to the traditional social hierarchy. Describing the 
TRC hearings, Kelsall noted:  
 
The perpetrators' very attendance at the hearings registered their partial 
subordination to the community, their compliance with its norms, and their 
willingness to submit to its judgement.83 
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Combined with the discourse of victimhood, aimed at easing acceptance of former 
combatants, this may also have constituted an undoing – at least in the minds of ex-fighters 
– of the forms of independence and ‘adulthood’ they had claimed through war. Again, 
Kelsall’s interpretation of the TRC’s mission is telling:  ‘While the perpetrators had been 
arrogant, swaggering, and terrifyingly capricious during the war, the Commission was now 
working to break their pride and reduce them to the status of obedient children.’84   
 
The work of reducing ex-combatants to the status of children has also been undertaken by 
agencies returning former child soldiers to their communities.85 Assisted in this endeavour 
by a discourse of victimhood, there has nevertheless been confusion – or perhaps 
disagreement – about how a child should behave. As Shepler points out, recipient 
communities expected returnees ‘to become mute and return to their place at the bottom 
of the social hierarchy’, yet the post-war humanitarian discourse in Sierra Leone has 
simultaneously encouraged youths to seek empowerment and make their voices heard.86 
For older ex-combatant youth, it is the discourse of rights and political empowerment that 
resonates, and to which ‘deeper’ reconciliation and reintegration may appear opposed.87 
Along these lines, Bolten finds that in refusing to fully incorporate ex-combatants, civilians 
in Makeni were   ‘challenging their youth to conform to a particular set of social behaviors 
that once again rendered their potential co-opted, banishing them to the margins of the 
social world if they resisted.’88 
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Traditional and ritualistic forms of reconciliation, often seen as preferable to internationally-
driven retributive and restorative justice, may likewise carry an implicit requirement to 
conform. With an emphasis on ‘social conformity rather than equality and justice’, Stovel 
warns, they ‘may reinforce the pre-war status quo.’89 Although programmes such as Fambul 
Tok appear sensitive to this concern, their underlying message is that they aim to help 
communities rebuild in their pre-war image. Describing Fambul Tok’s success in relation to 
the transformation of individuals, Hoffman adds: ‘These individual stories are linked to the 
reassertion of the traditional communal ties and values that were fractured by the war.’90 
The difficult reality facing many communities in Sierra Leone is that not all ex-combatants or 
youth wish to return to traditional values fractured by the war. For some, this reflects the 
legacy of socialisation into the violent world of the RUF, in which their identity and self-
esteem in formative years were shaped by the power of the gun and the respect accrued 
through a capacity for violence. They struggle to accept the authority of others or to return 
an ‘ordinary’ social status. However, contrary to some civilian perceptions, in other 
instances ex-combatants’ reluctance to submit to traditional authorities and values is a 
conscious socio-political ‘rebellion’, rather than behavioural condition. For these individuals, 
life in rural villages is not seen as providing the social, political and economic 
opportunities,they seek. Though conditions in urban centres such as Freetown are hardly 
ideal, they may offer modes of sociality that promise greater independence and 
opportunities for advancement. Thus many ex-combatants have preferred to remain in the 
city, regardless of the willingness of home communities to incorporate them.  
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The pact of accommodation enables many ex-combatants and their communities to 
peacefully coexist without having to compromise on questions of traditional political 
hierarchies and social values; a compromise that might be required to achieve deeper forms 
of reconciliation and reintegration. However, where former fighters seek to return home, or 
in locations where victims live in close proximity to former aggressors, lack of deeper 
reconciliation has fostered disruptive everyday frictions and prevented ex-combatants’ 
social incorporation, a factor that impedes their economic integration as ‘useful’ members 
of their community. Whilst some forms of locally-grounded reconciliation, drawing on ritual 
and tradition, have proved useful in addressing this problem, they have also underlined the 
generational tensions that partly sustain the pact of accommodation. Though mutual 
toleration has been pragmatically achieved for the sake of avoiding conflict and securing 
basic welfare needs, these tensions bring out the fundamental question of what kind of 
peace and development Sierra Leoneans seek. Addressing this question would require 
tackling one of the driving-forces of the civil war – the disaffection of youth with traditional 
authority structures and lack of opportunities – but to do so would be an important step 
towards more comprehensive reconciliation and reintegration.  
 
It is important to understand that the reality of post-conflict Sierra Leone is neither a mirror-
image of the pre-war socio-political landscape, nor an entirely radical departure. Society and 
culture should not be treated as static, and in many respects the pact of accommodation 
may be judged to be valuable in buying space and time for Sierra Leoneans to navigate 
socio-political transformations at their own pace, without risking conflict. Such navigation 
calls for greater attention to the changing role or status of youths, as well as to resistance to 
these changes. Post-conflict discourses of human rights and political entitlements have been 
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adopted and shaped by ex-combatants and youths, challenging traditional hierarchies and 
gerontocratic structures in various ways.  However, youth-led political and development 
organisations have also reproduced or been co-opted by established forms of 
patrimonialism, and as Boersch-Supan argues: ‘This reinforcement of patrons’ positions 
blocks effective changes towards a more egalitarian distribution of power.’91 The changes 
that must take place in Sierra Leone for deep reconciliation and reintegration to occur are 
thus likely to be negotiated over the long-term rather than the short-term. The pact of 
accommodation provides a degree of stability which allows Sierra Leoneans to focus on 
their critical, practical needs, whilst buying time for this negotiation in a context of peace.  
 
 
Lessons of Reconciliation in Sierra Leone 
 
Sierra Leone’s experience underlines the importance of appreciating the specific local 
contexts in which retributive and restorative justice are applied. In this regard, we should be 
wary of suggesting a one-size-fits-all approach when drawing wider lessons for transitional 
justice. Taking this into account, at least four broad lessons may be helpfully identified from 
Sierra Leone’s engagement with processes of reconciliation and reintegration. 
 
First, internationally-sponsored exercises must take account of local demands and ideas 
about what forms of justice and reconciliation are desired. It cannot be assumed that all 
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societies will seek to address a legacy of brutal conflict in the same way, and if formal truth-
telling and legal trials may play a useful practical or symbolic role, they will nevertheless 
gain limited popular ‘buy-in’ if they are seen as insensitive or irrelevant to local needs. This 
may seem an obvious point, yet Fambul Tok found that the people they had worked with: 
 
… consistently described this as the first time that they were consulted on the 
kind of reconciliation they wanted and needed, and the first time they were 
actively encouraged to identify and draw upon their local traditions and 
resources to engage in this kind of process.92  
 
Practices of reconciliation may be enhanced through an incorporation of existing traditions 
and techniques of dealing with the past, yet this too calls for careful scrutiny of local 
dynamics. Traditional mechanisms of justice should not be romanticised, and the case of 
Sierra Leone shows that they can risk reinforcing social divides as much as healing them 
where they are not tailored to the needs of all members of society. Ultimately, neither 
entirely local, traditional, or international processes of reconciliation are likely to succeed 
alone in post-conflict settings – some combination will be needed. In Sierra Leone, 
discourses of reconciliation and reintegration were joined with and shaped by conventions 
of ‘forgetting’ and a pragmatic popular focus on immediate welfare needs. It should be 
recognised that in this respect, the discourse of peace cannot be ‘controlled’ through 
sensitisation programmes and the mere dissemination of information. By taking local views 
and needs of justice into account from the outset, transitional justice programmes may 
enjoy greater uptake and input from those intended to benefit. As Fletcher and colleagues 
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argue, the central question for effective transitional justice is not whether an international 
or domestic trial is preferable, formal truth-telling or cultural tradition, but rather ‘what is 
most beneficial to the people whose lives have been disrupted or even destroyed by the 
perpetrators of violence?’93  
 
Second, a related lesson is that societies emerging from protracted violent conflict may 
place much greater value on the ‘usefulness’ of justice in terms of practical, often material, 
benefit, than conventional transitional justice mechanisms reflect. In Sierra Leone, the 
perception that the victims of war received little useful assistance from the SCSL and TRC in 
their daily lives, and the amount of resources expended on both institutions, has caused 
great frustration. The message of transitional justice mechanisms must be unambiguous, 
and if material rewards or other forms of assistance are not on offer, implicit suggestions to 
the contrary will foster disillusionment and anger. The importance of reintegration 
programmes to reconciliation efforts, and vice versa, must also be appreciated. In Sierra 
Leone, perceived favouring of ex-combatants with skills-training and cash payments did 
little to assist reconciliation. Greater provision of reparations to victims of abuses may 
provide a solution, yet economic constraints and the possibility of fresh grievances caused 
by unequal or inconsistent implementation of any such programme makes this no easy 
undertaking. Interventions must carefully assess the relative advantages and disadvantages 
of offering material assistance, bearing in mind that in some contexts, practical utility may 
be the criteria by which justice is judged, and where none is forthcoming, many will be 
unable to forgive, forget, or feel at peace.  
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Third, as a case often described as a ‘success’, Sierra Leone’s post-war experience raises the 
critical question of precisely how to judge success in reconciliation. The absence of war and 
the day-to-day peaceful coexistence of non-combatants with ex-combatants may be one 
measure. However, looking below the surface in Sierra Leone betrays an absence of deeper 
forms of reconciliation. The form of reintegration that has been achieved, in which ex-
combatants have been accommodated but not necessarily fully incorporated, cautions 
against conflating the absence of war with the presence of peace, at least in a form desired 
by all sections of society. Surface-level reconciliation, described in Sierra Leone here as the 
pact of accommodation, may mask fundamental problems of division and dislocation.  
 
Fourth, and finally, pragmatic forms of reconciliation and reintegration should not be seen 
as necessarily negative for peace. They may actually serve to buy the time needed to resolve 
underlying issues impeding deeper reconciliation, such as generational and socio-political 
tensions in Sierra Leone, for which there can be no immediate post-war fix. However, it 
would equally be a mistake to ignore those underlying tensions, or to allow an emphasis on 
peaceful coexistence to stall socio-political changes indefinitely. Stovel warns of the ‘danger 
that policy-makers, planners and donors will see peaceful coexistence as the only ‘realistic’ 
form of reconciliation, and will not commit themselves to the actions required to achieve 
deeper, sentient reconciliation.’94 The same danger applies to ex-combatants and the 
communities with which they seek reconciliation and reintegration. Transitional justice must 
be understood as a long-term and ongoing process, and where a pragmatic pact of 
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accommodation exists, it must be viewed as a stepping-stone to addressing deeper issues of 
reconciliation, rather than an end point in itself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
